This book is a collection of essays that offer original logical and philosophical investigations into the century-long endeavor to understand paradoxes. It bridges the gap between the two most prominent traditions in the analysis of paradoxes: the truth-theoretic and proof-theoretic approaches. The truth-theoretic tradition stems from Alfred Tarskis solution to the semantic paradoxes, while the proof-theoretic tradition dates back to Dag Prawitzs analysis of set-theoretic paradoxes in terms of structural proof theory. Rather than viewing these traditions as competing perspectives, this volume advocates for the idea that a deeper understanding of paradoxes requires insights from both truth-theoretic and proof-theoretic conceptions of language and meaning. Although the collection does not aim to be exhaustive, it seeks to highlight the vast scope of the subject and its deep connections to various fields of inquiry. The essays are organized into four sections: the first focuses on methodology, the second and third examine paradoxes through the conventional lenses of logical investigation—semantics and syntax—, and the fourth presents a selection of paradoxes that extend beyond the interplay between syntax and semantics, exploring other dimensions of human rationality.