Winner of the Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize as announced at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Meeting on September 27, 2024   The book offers a systematic reconstruction of the disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger from the formers point of view, but without falling into any form of Husserlian apologetics. The main thesis is that Husserls critique of Heideggers existential analytics as a form of philosophical anthropology entails a deeper fundamental thesis, namely, that Heidegger confuses the subject matter of first philosophy (the transcendental subject) with metaphysics (in the Husserlian sense of the expression). At stake in Husserls critique of Heideggers philosophy in Being and Time is the refusal to transcendentalize the irrational aspects of our human existence. This second volume focuses on the question of being, clarifying the distinction between ontology and metaphysics in Husserls thought. In fact, contrary to a long-standing and established interpretive tradition, according to which Husserls phenomenology is metaphysically neutral, the book shows to what extent Husserl always understood as the ultimate goal of his philosophizing the positive foundation of a metaphysics. This volume appeals to students and researchers.