If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, “Who are you?� I, in answering, might say “I don’t know who in the world I am.� Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what “I� refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, “Who are you?� has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal “myself�. For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but “Who are you?� or “Who am I?� might be more anguished and be rendered by “What sort of person are you?� or “What sort am I?� Such a question often surfaces in the face of a “limit-situation�, such as one death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our “centers�, what we also will call “Existenz�. “Existenz� here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of “vocation�. We will see that it has especial ties to one Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage “Yonder�.